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Sovereignty between the Katechon and the Eschaton: Rethinking the 
Leviathan 
Abstract  
This paper both rejects the reading of Hobbes’s Leviathan as a secularised katechon 
and rethinks anew the questions of sovereignty and politics in his thought. It does so 
by examining the eschatological character of his politico-theological understanding of 
the relation between the kingdom of the Leviathan and the kingdom of God. Indeed, 
through different contemporary readings of Hobbes’s theory of the State, this paper 
offers an insight into the concrete eschatology at operation in Hobbes’s thought and 
underscores its relevance for the understanding of government, biopolitics and 
sovereignty. This is achieved through two different, albeit interconnected 
undertakings, which in turn allow us to agree but also to go beyond Agamben’s claim 
that the State, in Hobbes, does not have a katechontic function.  The first is an 
exposition of the a-teleological character of Hobbes’s eschatology and his 
metaphysics of motion. The second involves a consideration of the temporality and 
the nature of the relation between the a-historical world of reason and the historical 
world of faith that underpins Hobbes’s theory of the State. Contrary to the 
contemporary interpretations in which Hobbes’s eschatology is presented as future 
regarding, we will highlight the chronological coincidence between the historical time 
of faith and the a-historical time of the Leviathan, placing Hobbes within the political 
coordinates of Benjamin’s messianism. By bringing this eschatological perspective to 
the fore, not only will the reading of Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty that aligns him 
with liberalism be problematized, but also, an analysis of the resources that Hobbes 
offers to imagine a different form of politics will be developed.  
 
Introduction 
This paper both rejects the reading of Hobbes’s Leviathan as a secularised katechon 
and rethinks anew the questions of sovereignty and politics in his thought. It does so 
by examining the eschatological character of his politico-theological understanding of 
the relation between the kingdom of the Leviathan and the kingdom of God. Indeed, 
through different contemporary readings of Hobbes’s theory of the State,1 this paper 
offers an insight into the concrete eschatology at operation in Hobbes’s thought and 
underscores its relevance for the understanding of government, biopolitics and 
sovereignty. This is achieved through two different, albeit interconnected 
                                               
1 In particular we will draw from Pocock’s study of Hobbes’s eschatology in John G.A. Pocock, 
Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History (London: Methuen, 1972); from 
James Martel, Subverting the Leviathan: Reading Thomas Hobbes as a Radical Democrat (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007); and from Giorgio Agamben, Stasis: Civil War as a Political 
Paradigm, Trans. Nicholas Heron (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015). 
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undertakings, which in turn allow us to agree but also to go beyond Agamben’s claim 
that the State, in Hobbes, does not have a katechontic function.2  The first is an 
exposition of the a-teleological character of Hobbes’s eschatology and his 
metaphysics of motion. The second involves a consideration of the temporality and 
the nature of the relation between the a-historical world of reason and the historical 
world of faith that underpins Hobbes’s theory of the State.  
 
By bringing this eschatological perspective to the fore, not only will the reading of 
Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty that aligns him with liberalism be problematized, but 
also, an analysis of the resources that Hobbes offers to imagine a different form of 
politics will be developed. Indeed, contrary to the contemporary interpretations in 
which Hobbes’s eschatology is presented as future regarding, we will highlight the 
chronological coincidence between the historical time of faith and the a-historical 
time of the Leviathan, placing Hobbes within the political coordinates of Benjamin’s 
messianism. Before developing this interpretation of Hobbes’s theory of the State, a 
brief account of the katenchontic reading of his theory of sovereignty will be 
presented in the opening section, followed by a critique of this reading and an 
examination of both the particularity of Hobbes’s eschatology and the understanding 
of motion that grounds his theory of the state.  
 
 
The Leviathan as a secularized Katechon 
  
The notion of the katechon, which in Greek translates as "the one who withholds"   - 
κατέχων -, or as "that which withholds" - τὸ κατέχον - is found in Paul’s letters to the 
Thessalonians in an eschatological context: in explaining why the second coming of 
Christ had been delayed, Paul asserts that until the man of lawlessness “seats 
himself in the sanctuary of God and declares himself to be God”3 there will not be a 
second coming. “You know what it is that is now holding him back, so that he will be 
revealed when the time comes. For the mystery of anomy is already at work, but only 
until the person now holding him back (ho katechon) is removed. Then the lawless 
                                               
2 Agamben, Stasis, p.  53.  
3 2 Thessalonians 2:3-9 (Revised Standard Version).  
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one (anomos) will be revealed, whom the Lord will abolish with the breath of his 
mouth, rendering him inoperative by the manifestation of his presence (parousia).”4 
At first glance, the katechon appears as an “ambiguous figure who both holds back 
the already operative ‘mystery of lawlessness’ and, by extending secular history, 
delays the final redemption”.5 Yet, as Agamben suggests, if the identification of the 
man of lawlessness with the Antichrist is commonly accepted, the question that 
remains open is that of the identification, character and nature of the katechon.6 
  
A tradition inaugurated with Tertullian who associated the katechon with the Roman 
Empire and that reaches a climax with Schmitt’s Political Theology,  has given a 
positive historical function to the katechon as a power that delays or holds back the 
end of time. It is indeed with Schmitt, who this passage from the Thessalonians is 
read as grounding a Christian doctrine of State Power,  that the katechon assumes a 
positive purpose more clearly, . There is, Schmitt argues, “in every century a 
concrete bearer of this force and that it is a matter of finding it [...] This is a total 
presence hidden under the veils of history.”7 Although its essence is not to be 
eternal, for Schmitt, the katechon is capable of being a historical power that 
stabilizes, as it were, the terrain of profane politics by restraining the coming of the 
antichrist. 
  
Nevertheless, by remaining confined within Schmitt’s understanding of order, this 
interpretation of the katechon – as that which “restrains the appearance of the 
Antichrist and the end of the present eon”8 – is unable to grasp the ambivalent 
character of the katechon. “Despite its obscurity” Agamben suggests, Paul “does not 
harbor any positive valuation of katechon. To the contrary, it is what must be held 
back in order that the ‘mystery of anomia’”9 be fully revealed. By protecting the 
people from the antichrist, the katechon defers the second coming, the final battle 
                                               
4 2 Thess, 2: 3-9. 
5 Jessica Whyte, Catastrophe and Redemption: The Political Thought of Giorgio Agamben (New York: 
SUNY Press, 2013), p. 7. 
6 Cfr. Giorgio Agamben, The Time that Remains, trans. Patricia Dailey (Stanford University Press, 
2005). 
7 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europeaum, 
trans. G.L. Umen (New York: Telos, 2003), pp. 59-60. 
8 Ibid., p 59. 
9  Agamben, Time, p.  110. 
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and hence the victory of Christ.10 This is precisely what Roberto Esposito indicates 
when claiming that the katechon has an aporetic character which lies in the fact that 
“by holding back evil, [it] also prevents the ultimate good from manifesting itself.”11  
  
Therefore, by thinking the function of the katechon only from the perspective of the 
deferral of the Antichrist, Schmitt entrenches himself in a conservative position that, 
while achieving its intention of bringing to the fore a Christian theory of the state, 
ends up eliminating concrete eschatology and hence salvation from the theologico-
political horizon of profane politics: 
  
This Christian empire was not eternal. It always had its own end and 
that of the present eon in view. Nevertheless, it was capable of being a 
historical power. The decisive historical concept of this continuity was 
that of restrainer: katechon. “Empire” in this sense meant the historical 
power to restrain the appearance of the Antichrist and the end of the 
present eon; it was a power that withholds… The empire of the 
Christian Middle Ages lasted only as long as the idea of the katechon 
was alive.12  
  
  
This deferral of the eschaton, this delaying of the advent of the end, takes in Schmitt 
the concrete form of the Christian Empire: “the belief that a restrainer holds back the 
end of the world provides the only bridge between the notion of an eschatological 
paralysis of all human events and a tremendous historical monolith like that of the 
Christian Empire of the Germanic Kings.”13 Therefore, for Schmitt, the present of 
humanity, as Agamben suggests, is “an interim founded on the delay of the 
                                               
10 For Agamben, “it is therefore possible to conceive the Katechon and anomos not as two separate 
figures (unlike John, Paul never mentions and antichristos), but as one single power before and after 
the final unveiling. Profane power - albeit of the Roman Empire or any other power - is the semblance 
that covers up the substantial lawlessness [anomia] of messianic time. In solving the ‘mystery,’ 
semblance is cast out, and power assumes the figure of the anomos, of that which is the absolute 
outlaw [del fuorilegge assoluto]. This is how the messianic is fulfilled in the clash between the two 
parousiai: between that of the anomos, who is marked by the working of Satan in every power 
[potenza], and that of the Messiah, who will render energia inoperative in it”. Agamben, Time, p. 111.   
11 Robeto Esposito, Two: The Machine of Political Theology and the Place of Thought, trans. Zakiya 
Hanafi (New York: Fordham University Press), p. 77. 
12 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europeaum, 
trans. G.L. Umen (New York: Telos, 2003), pp. 59-60. 
13 Ibid., p. 60. 
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Kingdom.”14  In this particular sense, the katechon appears in Schmitt as that which 
produces history, or as Bredekamp has put it “the space of time between the present 
and the coming of the Antichrist.”15 It is for this reason that, according to this 
interpretation, the katechon rules out concrete eschatology and in so doing produces  
the “neutralisation of a philosophy of history oriented toward salvation.”16 
   
It comes as no surprise that Hobbes’s theory of the state has been taken as a 
secularization of this particular understanding of the katechon. It is in Hobbes that an 
understanding of the state as destined to block catastrophe and  to delay the end of 
times comes to the fore in a paradigmatic manner: Leviathan holds back civil war, it 
keeps Behemoth in check, it imposes, at all costs, order over anomos. Hobbes’s 
theory of state has been firmly placed within a tradition that concedes a positive 
valence to the katechon. For Prozorov, for instance,  “the central figure in this 
secularization of the logic of the katechon is of course Thomas Hobbes, whose 
theory of sovereignty seeks precisely to ward off the anomic catastrophe of war of 
every man against every man, whose potentiality is inscribed in the state of 
nature.”17 Needless to say,  Prozorov is not alone in making this claim. In his study of 
the secularization of sacrificial christianity Wolfgang Palaver not only claims that “if 
we study Hobbes's political philosophy carefully, we will realize that his state 
functions like a katéchon: it provides for the permanent prevention of chaos and 
violence”18 but also elevates the concept of the katechon as the organising principle 
of Hobbes’s theory of the state. 
  
However, this reading of Hobbes’s theory of the state from the perspective of 
Schmitt’s understanding of the katechon is not immediately justified and needs 
clarification. For Palaver there are “deep theological roots to Hobbes's katéchontic 
                                               
14 Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and 
Government, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa (Stanford University Press, 2011), p. 7. 
15 Horst Bredekamp, Melissa Thorson Hause and Jackson Bond “From Walter Benjamin to Carl 
Schmitt via Thomas Hobbes,” Critical Inquiry 25 (1999): 252. 
16 Agamben, Kingdom, p. 7.  
17 Sergei Prozorov, “The katechon in the age of biopolitical nihilism,” Continental Philosophy Review 
45, (2012): 487. 
18 Wolfgang Palaver, “Hobbes and the Katechon: The Secularization of Sacrificial Christianity,” 
Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis and Culture 2 (1995): 63. 
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solution to civil war”19 that he ultimately traces back to the resemblance of Leviathan 
with Hobbes’s own image of God. Secularization, in this sense, takes the form of an 
analogy, a correspondence between sovereign power and God by which the former 
imitates the later. The secularization of the katechon in Hobbes represents then, for 
Palaver, the transfer of a theological concept to political philosophy. This reading of 
Hobbes’s Leviathan is further justified with recourse to the historical developments 
produced with the advent of the Reformation:  
  
The Reformation had put an end to Medieval Christianity. There was no 
longer a real successor of the Roman Empire. The Catholic Church was not 
able to function as an institution that could create order in Europe. Religion 
became instead a source of wars. Hobbes, therefore, had a secular 
institution that could at least locally secure peace and tranquillity. He 
proposed the secular state as a creator of peace. The differences between 
Hobbes’s secular state and medieval Christianity can explain his break with 
the katechon-tradition of the Roman Empire [...]. Hobbes’s state can, 
nevertheless, be called a katechon.  As a secularised concept, transferred to 
the State, the concept of the katechon can be seen as a structuring principle 
of Hobbes’s political philosophy.20    
  
In The Time that Remains Agamben acknowledges without explicitly endorsing this 
possible interpretation of Hobbes that locates within the very logic of Leviathan a 
positive Katechontic function. “In a certain sense” writes Agamben, “every theory of 
the state, including Hobbes’s – which thinks of it as a power destined to block or 
delay catastrophe – can be taken as a secularization of this interpretation of 2 
Thessalonians 2”.21 Whether Agamben is discarding or not this interpretation that 
places Hobbes’s Leviathan within a Schmittian understanding of the katechon is not 
immediately clear.  However, the degree of ambivalence left unresolved in the Time 
that Remains with regards to Hobbes’s theory of the state finds an unequivocal 
response in Agamben’s Stasis: in Hobbes, profane politics does not have, “with 
respect to the kingdom, any katechontic function”.22 In the next section we will build 
upon this claim, arguing that a katechontic reading of Hobbes’s Leviathan is only 
possible at the expense of the eschatology at work in his philosophical system. 
Reading Hobbes’s theory of the state from an eschatological perspective, we argue, 
                                               
19 Ibid., p. 64. 
20 Ibid., p. 67. 
21 Agamben, Time, p. 110. 
22 Agamben, Stasis, p. 53.  
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allows us to revisit his conception of the sovereignty and to rethink anew the nature 
of the relation between the state, security and happiness, or to put it differently, the 
biopolitical undertone of his philosophical system.  
 
The concrete eschatology in Hobbes’s thought 
 
Widely regarded as the pre-eminent thinker of the State tout court, one would be 
forgiven in thinking that for Hobbes the state constitutes the telos of human action, 
the terminus ad quem of individual human life that begins in the infamous state of 
nature. What we seek to do in this section, however, is to displace this account by 
reorienting Hobbesian concepts around the question of time, and in particular the 
question of eschatology. Following on from G.J.A Pocock, whose recovery of the 
theological aspects of Hobbes’s thought is crucial, we seek to develop an account of 
sovereignty and the state that places the temporal dynamic at the centre of analysis 
by recovering the theologico-eschatological aspects of his thought. 
 
As Derrida has noted many Hobbes scholars have identified Hobbes as developing a 
distinctly modern conception of sovereignty, one that is “emancipated from theology 
and religion”.23 Yet, and we are in agreement with Derrida on this point, things are 
not quite so simple, and a reading which stresses the secular nature of Hobbes’s 
work does more to obscure than to enlighten. Indeed, the theological aspects of 
Hobbes’s work are crucial in order to understanding his conception of sovereignty. 
While Derrida sees in Hobbes a profound and fundamental theological and religious 
basis for his conception of state, this is presented in terms of the way sovereignty is 
an imitation of God on earth. For Derrida the human sovereign is “standing in for the 
absolute sovereign God.”24 What Derrida’s reading misses, however, is the concrete 
eschatological aspect of Hobbes’s work. Indeed, it is not only the case that Hobbes’s 
philosophical system is underpinned by theology, but also, and perhaps more 
crucially, the theological aspect has a concrete eschatological character. 
 
                                               
23 Jacques Derrida The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume 1, trans. Geoffrey Bennington (University of 
Chicago Press, 2009), p. 53. 
24 Ibid. 
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To place eschatology in Hobbes’s thought in its proper locus, that is, as concrete 
eschatology, we can begin to unravel any simplistic notion of the Hobbesian state 
that presents it as that which holds back any and all disorder. G.J.A Pocock  has 
provided the groundwork for an examination of the eschatological aspects of 
Hobbes’s work ultimately identifying that there are two distinct realms operating in 
his philosophical system. One is that of “nature known to us through our philosophic 
reasoning on the consequences of our affirmations, the other of divine activity known 
to us through prophecy, the revealed and transmitted words of God”.25 It is not the 
case that Hobbes’s thought is secularised in any meaningful sense, but rather he 
conceives of two distinct contexts: an “a-historical world of reason” which is the 
location of the Leviathan and a “historical world of faith” which is to say the world of 
prophecy and scripture and which culminates in the kingdom of God.26 Indeed, 
Hobbes is emphatic here and decries the abuses of scripture which mistakes this 
world, or this church as the kingdom of God.27 Considered in this light, the kingdom 
of God is therefore put into its eschatological context: the second coming of Christ 
will inaugurate the kingdom of God which marks the end of the profane kingdom of 
the Leviathan: 
 
The Kingdom of God, which CHRIST was sent by God the Father to restore, 
does not begin until his second coming, in fact from the day of judgement 
when he is to come in majesty in the company of angels.28 
 
Here it is made manifest that Hobbes did not conceive of the Leviathan as the end-
point of politics, and hence this goes directly against Schmitt’s thesis that “the goal 
and terminus is security of the civil, stately condition”.29 Rather, Hobbes unremittingly 
insists on the “literal nature of Christ’s return, the literal, physical and political 
character of his kingdom after the resurrection of the saints”.30 The kingdom of God 
is not, for Hobbes a metaphorical kingdom, but constitutes a “kingdom properly so 
                                               
25 Pocock, Time, History and Eschatology, p. 159.  
26 Ibid., p. 166. 
27 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Classics, 2014), p. 458. 
28 Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen, ed. and trans. Richard Tuck (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
pp. 206-207. 
29 Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a 
Political Symbol, trans. George Schwab (London: Greenwood Press, 1996), p. 31. 
30 Pocock, Time, History and Eschatology, p. 173. 
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named”.31 That Hobbes conceives of the state not as an end-point but as that which 
must disappear with the second coming of Christ can be further explained with 
recourse to his metaphysics of motion, which underpins the concrete character of his 
eschatology.  
  
In the Hobbesian universe ontological primacy is given to motion. In this way, 
Hobbes diverges from Aristotelean metaphysics which sees motion only as a thing 
striving towards its telos where it will come to finally rest: “[i]n that which has an end, 
a prior stage and the stages that follow are done for the sake of that end.”32 For 
Aristotle, the end is the goal and the terminus of the motion, hence he believed that 
the nature of a particular movement is determined by its intended destination. 
Therefore,  in identifying a particular movement “the crucial consideration is the telos 
not the immediate or efficient cause”.33 Things strive towards their fulfillment, and 
this is what moves them. There is then a concern in Aristotle with wholeness, 
completeness and stasis – the natural teleology that drives things toward their 
fulfillment – : “movement was expected to terminate itself by completing the 
actualization of that which was moved”.34 In short, in the Aristotelian system, motion 
in and of itself becomes philosophically irrelevant as pre-eminence is given to 
destination and fulfilment.  
 
On the other hand for Hobbes “organisms are characterized by natural tendencies, 
by inherent strivings; but this is the striving to persist, not the desire to reach a 
telos.”35 Perhaps nowhere else in Hobbes’s writings does this partial rejection of 
Aristotelian metaphysics become so explicit as in his tract on Thomas White: 
 
If we do allow the above interpretation [of Aristotle’s definition] we may 
reasonably infer that that good genius which moves the earth has had 
either [i] a goal or objective towards which it moves the world or [ii] 
motivation towards, or a purpose in, the moving. We may not infer 
however that the world was endowed with motion with the express 
purpose that the motion so imparted, i.e. with the intention of [its 
                                               
31 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 309. 
32 Aristotle, Physics, trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle (Indiana University Press, 1969), p. 199a. 
33 Thomas Spragens, The Politics of Motion: The World of Thomas Hobbes (University of Kentucky 
Press, 1973), p. 57. 
34 Ibid., p. 58. 
35 Ibid., p. 70 
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reaching] an end, should at some time or other cease and be 
terminated.36  
 
What we wish to emphasise here, however, is that it is this understanding of motion 
as having an infinite and a-teleological character, that undergirds Hobbes political 
philosophy. Indeed, Hobbes uses the state to illustrate the point that, while the 
material that constitutes a thing may change, this does not necessarily entail that it 
takes a different form, i.e. it can still be the same thing: “When any citizen dies, the 
material of the state is not the same, i.e. the state is not the same ens. Yet the 
uninterrupted degree [ordo] and motion of government that signalise a state ensure, 
while they remain as one, that the state is the same in number.”37 
 
There is a relation, as Hobbes reads Aristotle, between end and fulfillment. Once 
motion has reached its fulfillment, its telos, the motion then ceases. In this sense, 
motion is a temporary divergence from a natural state, which is rest. In Agamben’s 
discussion of Paul, he raises the question, albeit briefly, as to whether telos means 
end or fulfillment.38 In Aristotle, end and fulfillment coincide. In Hobbes, however, 
things are not moved by their telos as in Aristotle. If motion is ontologically primary 
then the most important thing to consider is not the telos but the motion itself: “but 
the causes of universal things (of those, at least, that have any cause) are manifest 
of themselves, or (as they say commonly) known to nature; so that they need no 
method at all; for they have all but one universal cause, which is motion”.39  Thus, 
the idea of ‘fulfillment’ is completely anathema to the Hobbesian universe, in which 
motion has no other cause outside of motion. In this sense, the question that 
Agamben poses – whether telos means end or fulfillment – is rendered obsolete by 
Hobbes for whom there is no fulfillment, no rest, just “endless, aimless motion.”40 If, 
as we aim to argue here, this underpins Hobbes’s philosophy of state then there is 
no tension between a potentiality of the state and its actuality, the state is not 
“striving” towards anything except its continued motion and existence. The state 
                                               
36 Thomas Hobbes, Thomas White’s De Mundo Examined, trans. H.W. Jones (Bradford University 
Press, 1976), p. 493. 
37 Ibid., p. 141. 
38 Agamben, Time, p. 98. 
39 Thomas Hobbes, Human Nature & De Corpore Politico (Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 197. 
40 Spragens, Politics, p. 63. 
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seen in this light cannot reach “fulfillment,” it only persists, until the kingdom of God 
is once again restored. Thus there is no telos, no fulfillment - there is only an end.  
Government is characterised by an  infinite motion which ensures nothing more than 
the survival of the state itself. This, however, while true of the state, taken as an 
abstraction, is complicated by the other aspect of Hobbes’s Leviathan – the historical 
dimension of faith. The evacuation of teleology does not entail an evacuation of 
eschatology. The movement of the state occurs, but not as a result of its end – which 
is the eschaton. The a-historical world of reason and state is autonomous with 
regard to the historical kingdom of God but eschatologically connected. Here, as 
Agamben notes, we find here a “curious affinity”41 to Benjamin’s Theologico-Political 
Fragment where we are presented with two distinct and autonomous realms, that of 
the messianic and that of the profane. While the messianic refers to the divine realm, 
the kingdom of God, the profane is the earthly historical condition in which we find 
ourselves. The kingdom of God, Benjamin writes, “is not the telos of the historical 
dynamic, it cannot be set as a goal. From the standpoint of history it is not the goal 
but the end”.42 
 
Benjamin presents the relation of the kingdom of the profane and the kingdom of 
God as two arrows, pointed in opposite directions. The profane dynamic, though not 
a part of the kingdom of God, nevertheless operates to increase the intensity of the 
force of the opposite messianic arrow. The profane, he tells us, “although not a 
category of this Kingdom, is a decisive category of its quietest approach”.43 So, the 
implicit eschatological economy that is presented here by Benjamin is that of two 
kingdoms that are separate, autonomous, yet related in that the profane 
inadvertently intensifies the approach of the messianic event. The kingdom of God is 
the end of the profane kingdom.  This particular conception of eschatology both 
coincides with and makes intelligible the relation that ties together sovereignty and 
the kingdom of God in Hobbes's thought. 
 
                                               
41 Agamben, Stasis, p. 52. 
42 Walter Benjamin, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, ed. Peter Demetz 
(USA: Random House, 1995), p. 312. 
43 Ibid. 
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The way Hobbes negotiates an a-teleological eschatology is by making a very 
explicit distinction between goal and end. His more general break with teleological 
thought is underlined in his commentary on Thomas White when he says that “goal” 
taken as “objective” and “intention” does not mean the same as when it is taken as 
“final point” or the “terminus ad quem of the motion’”.44 By distinguishing between 
goal and end in this way, Hobbes simultaneously allows for motion that is a-
teleological, but also a conception of time and history which contains an eschaton. 
Hobbes is unusual in this regard given that eschatology is more commonly 
associated with a teleological view of history. As Jacob Taubes writes:  
 
The nature of time is summed up by its irreversible unidrectionality 
[Einsinnigkeit]. From a geometrical point of view, time runs in a straight 
line in one direction [einsinnig]. The direction of this straight line is 
irreversible. This unidirectionality is common both to life and time. 
Unidirectionality and irreversibility are fundamental to their meaning. 
The purpose of this unidrectionality lies in the direction itself. The 
direction is toward an end; otherwise it would be directionless. The end 
is essentially Eschaton.45  
 
What we find in Hobbes, however is an a-teleological eschatology. Rather than 
progression occurring as a result of the end – as Aristotle would have it – or as the 
outcome of various stages of history which progress toward the final end – as Hegel 
would have it – Hobbes presents the Eschaton as something autonomous, bound to 
occur, not because of progress, but because of a promise by God.46 The structure of 
the promise is such that whatever actions humans take, the covenant with God 
cannot be broken and thus the kingdom to come, as what is promised, will occur. It is 
thus not the case that the Leviathan defers the end of time, nor does terrestrial 
sovereignty produce time, but rather, it occurs in a space between two kingdoms that 
is not of time. This goes directly against the tradition of eschatology which Jacob 
Taubes reads as operating in Hegel’s philosophy in which the “goal of history is the 
kingdom of the spirit”.47  
 
                                               
44 Hobbes, De Mundo Examined, p. 493. 
45 Jacob Taubes, Occidental Eschatology, trans. David Ratmoko (Stanford University Press, 2009), 
pp. 3-4. 
46Martel, Subverting, p. 137. 
47 Taubes, Occidental, p. 93. 
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The state’s goal which is characterized by Hobbes as safety, is also a concern with 
happiness, as he writes in De Cive: ‘by ‘safety’ we should understand not only the 
“simple preservation of life (but to the extent that is possible) that of a happy life”.48 
Happiness and safety are, we argue, not to be read as the telos of the state which 
determines its movement, but rather its goal. If the raison d'être of the state is 
evacuated from teleology, what is left is a goal for the state (happiness and safety) 
but one that cannot –  in the form of the Leviathan – reach fulfillment. As Agamben 
has noted in Paul’s first letter to the Thessalonians (which Hobbes cites in chapter 
44 of Leviathan) “peace and security coincide with the catastrophic advent of the day 
of the Lord (‘When they say, “there is peace and security”, then destruction will come 
upon them”.49 In this sense the state cannot reach a state of fulfillment as such, 
because as soon as it does the eschaton emerges. 
 
One of the consequences of the evacuation of eschatology from Leviathan is the 
notion that it is the Leviathan which produces time, and that this time is eternal. This 
claim is reinforced by Horst Bredekamp for whom Hobbes’s claim  that “this is the 
Generation of that great Leviathan, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that 
mortall God to which we owe under the Immortal God, our peace and defence”50 
should be read in the understanding that by generation Hobbes means “the creation 
not only of a body but also of time’”.51 It is this reading, the reading of Leviathan as 
creator of time that leads to the view that the time of the Leviathan is artificial 
eternity: “the Leviathan is built to last”.52 What we argue here, however, is that this 
account emphasises the eternal aspect at the expense of its artificiality. The eternity 
that Hobbes here refers to is an artificial one. Concrete eternity only occurs with the 
advent of the Eschaton where the “temporal end is eternity”.53 To claim, then, that 
the Leviathan is built to last is a mistake, one that covers over the ways in which the 
Leviathan is manifestly not built to last, i.e. in its mortal nature, where it will 
necessarily disappear once the sovereignty of God is re-established. It is this fragile 
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finite aspect to sovereignty that we would stress here, the Leviathan is not a God, 
but a mortal thing that cannot last.    
 
An eschatological reading of sovereignty 
The ambivalent structure of the katechon – which resides for Esposito in the fact that 
by being entrusted with the function of protection from chaos, it simultaneously 
defers the second coming of Christ –, resonates with Paulo Virno’s understanding of 
the katechon. For Virno too, the katechon not only oscillates between the negative 
and the positive but it also preserves the very oscillation between the two: “by 
placing itself in opposition to danger and also to the elimination of that danger, to the 
Antichrist and also to the Messiah, the katechon delays the end of the world.”54 It is 
in this sense that, for Virno, the katechon is “a radically anti-eschatological” 
concept”.55 Reading Hobbes’s theory of the state from a Schmittian katechontic 
perspective, therefore, amounts to a straightforward rejection of the a-teleological 
eschatology at work in Hobbes’s philosophical system. At the center of both 
interpretations of Hobbes’s theory of the state – the katechontic interpretation as put 
forward by Schmitt and the eschatological one, as discussed in the previous section 
– lies the question of the theological foundation of sovereignty and the problem of 
secularization.  
In section two of the Sovereign and the Beast Derrida approaches the question of 
sovereignty in Hobbes’s Leviathan by interrogating the sharp division established by 
Hobbes between the obligations owed to God and those owed to the state. For 
Hobbes, as Derrida suggests, sovereignty is absolutely indivisible, and hence, there 
can be no higher authority, no higher power than the sovereign. Those claiming that 
the obligations owed to God are to be prioritized over and above those owed to the 
sovereign are, according to Hobbes, misguided: “but this pretence of Covenant with 
God, is so evident a lye, even in the pretenders own consciences, that it is not only 
an act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and unmanly disposition.”56  There is, 
according to Hobbes, no “Covenant with God, but by mediation of some body that 
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representeth Gods Person.”57 Derrida takes this image of the sovereign as a 
mediator, as a lieutenant, to leave open “the possibility of a Christian foundation of 
politics”.58 But yet, what is at stake, as Derrida himself has put it, is “nothing less 
than the foundation – theological or not, religious or not, Christian or not – of the 
concept of political sovereignty”.59 
For Derrida, although Hobbes “does all he can to anthropologize and humanize the 
origin and foundation of state sovereignty”,60 this anthropologization remains 
attached to theology by a “double umbilical cord”: On the one hand, the human 
creation of the state imitates the work of God, and, on the other, sovereign power 
represents and stands in the place of God. This means, for Derrida, that one cannot 
simply claim that the modern concept sovereignty is emancipated from theology as it 
“retains a profound and fundamental theological and religious basis”.61 Nevertheless, 
as we have claimed earlier, Derrida’s insistence on the theological overtone of 
Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty, although implicitly at odds with the thesis that 
Hobbes’s Leviathan is a secularized katechon, does not capture the eschatological 
underpinnings of sovereignty, thereby arriving at partial conclusions regarding the 
relation between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the Leviathan. In short, the 
double umbilical cord that for Derrida ties Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty to the 
theological realm has an eschatological nature.  
The evacuation of concrete eschatology from Hobbes’s Leviathan, which is premised 
on the Schmittian-katechontic reading of Hobbes, comfortably places Hobbes’s 
political philosophy within a liberal understanding of sovereignty “premised on the 
abandonment of eschatology and the renunciation of immediate expectations of 
redemption.”62 Indeed, with the deactivation of eschatology, the katechon allows for 
an infinite government that “extends its blind and derisive dominion to every aspect 
of social life.”63 From this katechontic, yet mistaken reading, Hobbes’s theory of the 
state finds corroboration in contemporary forms of government which, for Agamben 
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take the form of an uninterrupted biopolitical economy that continuously defer the 
last Judgment. Crucially, for Agamben, “according to Christian theology there is only 
one legal institution which knows neither interruption nor end: hell. The model of 
contemporary politics – which pretends to an infinite economy of the world – is thus 
truly infernal.”64   
At first glance, a paradox therefore appears underneath the  eschatological 
articulation between the kingdom of the Leviathan and the kingdom of God in 
Hobbes’s thought. If the biopolitical economy that characterises the form that 
government takes under liberalism is grounded on a katechontic understanding of 
sovereignty, which in turn requires a rejection of eschatology, how should we then 
conceive of the biopolitical function of security in Hobbes’s political thought, which as 
we seen, is saturated with eschatology? What is to be made of Agamben’s claim that 
the frontispiece to the Leviathan “is also a courier that announces the biopolitical turn 
that sovereign power was preparing to make”65 once Hobbes’s theory of the state is 
placed in is eschatological locus? To put it shortly: how is it possible that we have, in 
Hobbes, a biopolitical turn that far from being predicated on the secularization of the 
Katechon coincides with an eschatological motif?  
This “biopolitical turn” becomes intelligible in the frontispiece of the Leviathan. Here 
there is a depiction of an almost empty city, devoid of people (who are in fact found 
in the body of the sovereign which dwells outside of the city). There are, however, 
some barely visible figures if one looks closely. Agamben credits Francesca Falk 
with establishing “that the two figures standing near the cathedral are wearing the 
characteristic beaked mask of plague doctors.”66  The other figures are armed 
guards: 
like the mass of plague victims, the unrepresentable multitude can be 
represented only through the guards who monitor its obedience and the 
doctors who treat it. It dwells in the city, but only as the object of the 
duties and concerns of those who exercise sovereignty.67 
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In placing the doctors and guards together as those who are “exercising 
sovereignty,” the way in which security and health became conjoined in a political 
relation is here given expression. Health and security were the concerns of a 
sovereign who, as discussed previously, had its raison d'être summed up by Hobbes 
as safety, which is always already a concern with happiness.68 It is worth noting, 
however, that Foucault’s biopolitical theory puts Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty at 
odds with biopolitics all together. Indeed, in Society Must be Defended Foucault uses 
Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty in order to make an analytical and a historical 
distinction between sovereignty and biopolitics. Here, although Foucault holds that 
we cannot simply locate a substitution of sovereignty by biopolitics, he understands 
biopolitics as emerging in a moment at which sovereignty retreats into the shadows: 
“an important phenomenon occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: 
the appearance – one should say the invention – of a new mechanism of power 
which had very specific procedures, completely new instruments, and very different 
equipment. It was, I believe, absolutely incompatible with relations of sovereignty”.69 
This supposed absolute incompatibility allows Foucault to define biopolitics as a 
“type of power [that] is the exact, point-for-point opposite of the mechanics of power 
that the theory of sovereignty described.”70 The sovereign right to take life – the right 
of killing – is replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death; the 
administration of bodies and the calculated management of life is then what 
becomes the centre of political strategies, as opposed to the right over life and death 
of sovereign power.71 In short, biopolitics for Foucault, as Esposito has put it, is 
“primarily that which is not sovereignty.”72   
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Nevertheless, as we have seen, Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty, far from being 
exhausted in the right to kill, is characterized primarily by functions that foresee the 
very mechanisms of power that Foucault describes as biopolitical, functions that 
testify to the crucial role of both the figure of the guard and the doctor in the 
frontispiece. For instance, in chapter XXIV of Leviathan Hobbes makes explicit that 
“The nutrition of a commonwealth consisteth, in the plenty, and distribution of 
materials conducing to life,”73 and then again in chapter XXX he specifies that by 
safety he does not mean “a bare preservation, but also all other contentments of life, 
which every man by lawful industry, without danger, or hurt to the commonwealth, 
shall acquire to himself.”74 Even more exemplary of the biopolitical nature of his 
theory of sovereignty, in talking about the functions of the commonwealth in De Cive, 
Hobbes suggests that if “a woman gives birth to a deformed figure, and the law 
forbids killing a human being, the question arises whether the newborn is a human 
being. The question then is, what is a human being? No one doubts that the 
commonwealth will decide.”75  
 
It is also in Agamben, however, that we find an explicit link between biopolitics and 
the Katechon: “it is the katechon that ensures the perpetuation of a catastrophic form 
of government that oscillates between the biopolitical protection and the 
abandonment of life”.76 Liberal government can be understood as katechontic 
precisely in the sense that it gives the impression of deferring the ultimate crisis: 
bloodshed and disorder that would reign in its absence. Agamben has treated the 
katechon thus writing that its force is called “law or state dedicated as it is to 
economy, which is to say dedicated as it is to the indefinite – and indeed infinie – 
governance of the world”.77 It is this Schmittian interpretation of the katechon that 
allows government to appear (and here we find the familiar reading of Hobbes) as a 
bulwark against catastrophe. What has happened, we argue, is that a form of liberal 
government has been retroactively read into Hobbes that doesn’t appear in Hobbes 
(at least in this form), himself. What our reading provides is thus a corrective to those 
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interpretations that read Hobbes as founding a certain form of liberal government 
that is katechontic, deferring the final crisis, yet oscillating from crisis to crisis in a 
perpetual state of emergency. 
 
By removing an essential telos for the state (for as discussed previously the motion 
of the state is necessarily a-teleological) its reason for being takes on a different hue 
to that of the liberal paradigm of government. Indeed, the liberal form that sees 
security as the telos, and end-point, an end in itself, then the catastrophe of 
incessant biopolitical governance is rendered inescapable. There is no way out of 
the state, for it is the state which provides life (or, indeed the conditions which mean 
life is possible). The state in this view then comes to occupy the entire horizon of 
political life, with a collapse into (an apolitical state of) chaos and disorder being 
seen as the only alternative. In this sense the state is the only thing that stands 
between life that can be lived and a state of war which renders life unliveable.  
 
What is at stake is whether we align politics with the prevention of the dissolution of 
the current order of things or with something altogether different, as opening a 
horizon of the end of the current order of things, its dissolution which gives to us a 
form of hope. This is not, however to relegate this hope to some form of post-history 
or indeterminate future, but rather to say that the future, as James Martel has put it, 
is radically contingent, and does not consist in the infinite deferral of chaos and 
catastrophe.78  
  
Messianism, eschatology and politics 
As we have seen, Hobbes’s eschatology has a particular a-teleological character. 
Certainly, Hobbes’s predicament does not focus on the “yet to come” but, as Martel 
has put it, “on the time of the now (including our “ kingdomless” time)”.79 Here, once 
again, the similarity between Hobbes and Benjamin comes to the fore. Just as for 
Benjamin, “every second of time was the strait gate through which the Messiah might 
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enter,”80 so does, according to Hobbes’s eschatology, the future become, as it were, 
always already here: 
Rather than becoming ‘homogenous empty time’ a sovereign future of life 
everlasting (i.e. eternal antipolitical, the very nightmare of a nonfuture that Arendt 
resists in her own work), the future becomes a matter of human responsibility 
and possibility. Stripped of its magical illusions, the future does not become 
empty but rather a blank reflection of something as yet unmade and unknown, 
something we strive toward via our promises.81 
 In this sense, Hobbes’s eschatology comes close to Paul’s conception of the 
messianic event as “the time of the now”. Agamben, who stresses the distinction 
between eschatology as the end of time, and messianic time as a “time that remains 
between time and its end”82 fails to grasp the specificity of Hobbes’s eschatology. 
Indeed, from the perspective of this distinction, Hobbes’s eschatology is not situated 
on the side of prophecy – that is, the future referential that announces the coming of 
the Messiah – but neither does it completely coincide with Agamben’s notion of the 
messianic time as time of the end. Rather, Hobbes’s eschatology, by virtue of its 
non-teleological nature, sits perfectly between prophecy and messianism: just as in 
Benjamin’s thought “where messianic time is not chronologically distinct from 
historical time”83 so does, in Hobbes’s thought, the historical time of faith and 
prophecy coincide chronologically with the a-historical time of the Leviathan. In this 
particular sense, one of the paradoxes of the messianic kingdom that Agamben 
identifies in Potentialities, could also be found in Hobbes’s articulation of the 
eschatological time and the time of the profane kingdom: 
One of the paradoxes of the messianic kingdom is, indeed, that another world 
and another time must make themselves present in this world and time. This 
means that historical time cannot simply be canceled and that messianic time, 
moreover, cannot be perfectly homogenous with history: (the two times must 
instead accompany each other according to modalities that cannot be reduced 
to a dual logic (this world/the other world).84 
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It is only in this context that Hobbes's theory of sovereignty acquires its proper 
meaning. Indeed, we are now in a position to claim that the bond that ties Benjamin’s 
thought to that of Hobbes go much further than the “curious affinity” between them – 
as observed by Agamben – allows us to infer. Certainly, it is not only the case that 
neither for Hobbes nor for Benjamin does the profane realm of politics have a 
katechontic function. Also, and more importantly, from the perspective of the 
eschatological underpinnings of Hobbes’s theory of the State, “in a very real sense, 
the future is already partially here via our promises and convents as instantiations of 
God’s promise”.85 Just as in Benjamin’s messianism in which the “Day of Judgment 
is not different from any others”86 and Agamben’s reading of Paul according to which 
messianic time is neither “to come” nor the end of time, so does Hobbes’s 
eschatology coincides with “the time of the now.”87 
It is in this light that one should read Pocock’s claim that Hobbes’s politics “have 
taken on a messianic dimension, just as the messianism they entail is almost brutally 
political.”88 This political brutality cuts the knot that ties liberalism with what Agamben 
has identified as the petrified or paralysed messianism that “like all messianism, 
nullifies the law, but then maintains it as the Nothing of Revelation in a perpetual and 
indeterminable state of exception”.89  Indeed, Hobbes’s eschatology forces us to 
divorce this theory of the state from all nihilistic considerations of the realm of 
profane politics, coinciding with accounts of the messianic event as a crisis and a 
“radical transformation of the entire order of the law”.90 This implies a subversion of 
Leviathan similar to that of James Martel for whom Hobbes “affords us a precious 
glimpse into a non-sovereign politics, one that, even if it fails to overcome 
sovereignty once and for all, does suggest that sovereignty is neither inevitable nor 
necessary the ‘best’ of a set of bad political choices”.91 Furthermore, as we have 
seen, placing Hobbes’s notion of sovereignty within the eschatological coordinates of 
his thought necessarily  entails a displacement of the katechontic reading of the 
State in itself and of its biopolitical function of peace and security. To put it 
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differently, in Hobbes, this katechontic biopolitical paradigm is turned on its head. 
Peace and security are not the telos of the state but it’s end. Thus biopolitics cannot 
take the form of an eternal oscillation but must activate the time of the end. This 
radically undermines any sense in which the Leviathan state is a barrier between 
peace and war, chaos and order by deferring catastrophe. By highlighting the place 
of God within Hobbes’s work we can begin to rethink the very foundations upon 
which liberal government has been thought. 
 
 
